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HEALTH CARE WORKER'S LEGAL DUTY TO




For over a decade Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) has plagued our nation.' As of March 31, 1993, the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC) had received reports of 289,320 cases of
AIDS, and the total number of reported deaths had reached 182,275.2
It is estimated that the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) has
infected over one million persons in the United States AIDS has
been an elusive foe. To date there is no vaccination, no cure, and the
end result is virtually always death. It is easy to understand why
AIDS frightens the public and public health officials.4 Recently, the
AIDS dilemma developed a frightening new dimension. The public
must now be concerned about contracting AIDS from those who com-
bat disease: health care workers (HCWs).5 Federal health officials
confirmed that in January of 1991 a Florida dentist had infected
Kimberly Bergalis and probably four other patients with HIV.6 The
infection of Kimberly Bergalis is the first documented case in which
1. The Second 100,000 Cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States,
June 1981-December 1991, 41 MoRBrorry & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 28 (Jan. 17, 1992) [herein-
after The Second 100,000 Cases]. The first case of AIDS was reported from the United States in
1981. Id.
2. Telephone Interview with the CDC National AIDS Clearinghouse at 1-800-458-5231
(June 2, 1993).
3. Marcia Angell, A Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1498
(1991).
4. The Second 100,000 Cases, supra note 1. From June 1981 through August 1989, the first
100,000 cases of AIDS had been reported to the CDC. Id. From September 1989 through No-
vember 1991, state and territorial health departments reported an additional 100,000 cases. Id.
5. Recommendation for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36 MoR-
BIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 28 (Aug. 21, 1987). Health-care workers are defined as
persons whose activities involve contact with patients or with blood or other body fluids from
patients in a health-care setting. Id. T'his includes students and trainees. Id. During the course
of this paper HCW will most often be referring to those health care workers who engage in
exposure prone invasive surgical procedures such as surgeons and dentists. See also Guidelines
For Protecting The Safety And Health of Health Care Workers, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Serv. (Sept. 1988).
6. Update: Transmission of HIV Infection During an Invasive Dental Procedure-Florida,
40 MoRBIDrrY & MORTALrY WKLY. REP. 21 (Jan. 18, 1991).
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HIV was transmitted from a health care worker to a patient.7 This
incident provoked great public concern. One opinion poll indicating
that ninety-five percent of respondents believed HIV-infected sur-
geons should be required to disclose their status to patients prior to
performing surgery.' Sixty-Five percent of the respondents said they
would discontinue all treatment with an HIV-infected HCW.9
Iatrogenic ° transmission of HIV raises a myriad of complex is-
sues regarding the manner in which society deals with infectious dis-
eases like AIDS. Some believe there is a fundamental tension
between protecting the public health and the civil liberties of those
who are infected. Others contend that any good public health policy
will also protect the civil liberties of those infected. 1 This balance is
at the heart of the question whether and to what extent disclosure of a
HCW's positive HIV status to patients should be required. It is a
question posed to the medical community, the legal community, and
society at large. Many have answered the question but there is no
social consensus. Politicians have attempted to answer the question
by proposing a myriad of politically expedient laws.1 The medical
community finds no consensus among its ranks, 3 and the legal com-
munity faces a virtually unprecedented issue. 4
Many say that infected physicians are not only ethically obligated
to disclose their infected status to their patients, but are also legally
obligated under the doctrine of "informed consent."" Due to the
deadly nature of AIDS, many feel an invasive procedure16 by an in-
fected physician poses a material risk which warrants a patient's con-
sideration before undergoing surgery. Others argue that the low risk
7. Id.
8. Barbara Kantrowitz et al., Doctors and AIDS, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991, 48, 51.
9. Id. at 52.
10. latrogenic transmission of HIV denotes the transmission of the virus from a HCW to a
patient. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DIcToNARY 884 (16th ed. 1989).
11. Sheldon H. Landesman, The HIV-Positive Health Professiona" Policy Options for Indi-
viduals, Institutions, and States, 151 ARCHIVEs OF INTERNAL MED. 665 (1991).
12. The Fear That a Doctor or Dentist Has AIDS: Punitive Legislation is No Substitute for
Professionalism, L.A. TudEss, July 25, 1991, at B6.
13. Landesman, supra note 11, at 656.
14. But see Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1991).
15. See infra section MI and IV.
16. An invasive procedure may be defined as:
[A] surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of major traumatic injuries
1) in an operating or delivery room, emergency department, or outpatient setting, in-
cluding both physicians' and dentists' offices; 2) cardiac catheterization and angi-
ographic procedures; 3) a vaginal or cesarean delivery or other invasive obstetric
[Vol. 29:429
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of transmission,' 7 the practical insufficiency of disclosure, the adverse
effect on HCWs, and the possible adverse effect on the health-care
system make mandatory disclosure an inappropriate response to the
problem of HCW to patient transmission of AIDS.'8
This comment will address the legal controversy surrounding the
duty of an HIV-infected HCW to disclose his or her infected status.
The comment begins by looking at the inception of the controversy
and then discusses various solutions offered by members of the medi-
cal community and the federal legislature. Next, the comment consid-
ers legal repercussions that might arise where a HIV-infected HCW
fails to disclose his or her status before performing an exposure-prone
invasive procedure. Finally, the comment concludes by giving the
opinion of this author regarding the desirability and probable fate of
mandatory disclosure.
I. POLITCAL AND MEDICAL MEASURES
In 1991, the fear of HCW-to-patient transmission of HIV became
a reality. DNA sequencing tests confirmed with 99.994 percent cer-
tainty that a Florida dentist transmitted HIV to Kimberly Bergalis and
probably to four other patients. 19 At the time of the dental proce-
dure, Bergalis had no identifiable risk factors, and Dr. Acer had the
same rare strain of the virus that Bergalis was later found to have.20
The plight of Kimberly Bergalis drew national attention because it
demonstrated that a person can avoid risky behavior and still contract
and die from AIDS.
The nationwide attention surrounding Bergalis and her lobbying
efforts in support of strict HIV testing and disclosure laws was largely
procedure during which bleeding may occur, or 4) the manipulation, cutting, or re-
moval of any oral or perioral tissues, including tooth structure, during which bleeding
occurs or the potential for bleeding exists.
Recommendation for Prevention of HiV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, supra note 5, at
6S-7S.
17. See, e.g., Lois J. Frankel, Commentary: AIDS Testing of Health Care Workers, 16 NovA
L. REv. 1161, 1165 (1992); Norman Daniels, HIV-Infected Professionals, Patient Rights, and the
'Switching Dilemma,' 267 JAMA 1368 (1992). The risk of HIV infection from a surgeon is less
than the chance of being killed by lightning, by a bee, and by being hit by falling aircraft. Id. at
1369.
18. See, eg., Steven Eisenstat, The HIV Infected Health Care Worker: The New AIDS
Scapegoat, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 301 (1992).
19. Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Vrirs to a Patient during an Invasive
Dental Procedure, 39 MoaBmrry & MoRTAL- Wu.Y. RaP. 489 (July 27,1990); Update: Trans-
mission of HIV Infection during an Invasive Dental Procedure-Florida, supra note 6.
20. Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient during an Invasive
Dental Procedure, supra note 19.
1993]
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responsible for public awareness and the immediate responses to the
problem by the medical community and lawmakers. Following the
Bergalis tragedy, both the political and medical communities re-
sponded with guidelines concerning infected HCWs and their patients.
Responses to the crisis vary and there is vast dispute concerning the
proper approach. Disputes center upon strength of patient protection
and privacy rights of HCWs.
A. The Medical Community
The response of the medical community to the Bergalis tragedy
was initially cautious. The American Medical Association (AMA),
the American Dental Association (ADA), the American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, and the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists temporarily recommended that HIV-infected
members who perform invasive procedures either disclose their sero-
positive status2 ' to their patients or refrain from performing invasive
procedures which pose an identifiable risk of transmission.22
In July 1991, the CDC issued updated guidelines for the preven-
tion of HIV transmission in the health care setting.23 These guidelines
recommended certain restrictions on the practice of infected HCWs
involved in "exposure prone" invasive procedures.2 4 Medical, surgi-
cal, and dental organizations were counseled to identify "exposure
prone" invasive procedures within their area of expertise.25 The
guidelines emphasized adherence to universal procedures, sanitary
and other prophylactic techniques designed to minimize the risk of
transmission, and advised HIV-infected HCWs to refrain from expo-
sure-prone invasive procedures until consulting with an expert review
panel as to when they may perform such procedures.26 For example,
21. A seropositive status means that a person possesses a specific antibody which indicates
a correspondingly specific infection. STDMAN's MEDICAL DicnONARY 1408 (25th ed. 1990).
22. See Karen C. Lieberman & Arthur 1. Derse, HIV-Positive Health Care Workers and the
Obligation to Disclose, 13 J. LGAL MED. 333, 338-39, n.38 (1992).
23. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and
Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MoIBIDrry &
MORTALrrY WL..Y. REP. 1, 5-6 (July 12, 1991).
24. Id. Universal procedures include such precautions as hand-washing, proper use and
disposal of needles or other sharp instruments and proper disinfection of reusable devices. Id.
Additionally, HCWs with exposed lesions should refrain from direct patient care and from han-
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an infected HCW might perform an invasive procedure with the pa-
tient's informed consent.27 While HCWs were counseled that they
should know their HIV status, mandatory testing was not recom-
mended because of its significant costs.' The universal precaution as-
pect of the guidelines garnered nearly unanimously support in the
medical community, but the disclosure recommendations met with
mixed reaction.29
B. The Legislature
Legislators initially responded to the Bergalis tragedy with sev-
eral proposals ranging from those that would impose criminal sanc-
tions upon health care providers who knowingly treated patients
without proper disclosure of their infected status 30 to those that man-
dated HIV testing of HCWs.3' These proposals never emerged from
committee.32
Congress finally settled on legislation requiring states to adopt
the CDC guidelines or their equivalent.33 Enactment of the CDC
guidelines gave rise to controversy regarding the guideline's disclosure
recommendations, the ambiguous definition of exposure-prone inva-
sive procedures, and potential effectiveness problems due to the
strictly advisory nature of the guidelines. Arguably, the guidelines
alone may not adequately address public reservations about the dan-
gers of HIV transmission in the health care setting.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. David M. Price, What Should We Do About HIV-Positive Health Professionals?, 151
ARcHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 658-59 (1991); Larry Gostin, The HIV-Infected Health Care Pro-
fessional, 151 ARcmvEs OF INTERNAL Mm. 663-65 (1991); Landesman, supra note 11, at 655-
57.
30. 137 CONG. REC. S9778 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (reporting on the Helm's amendment
which provided for a fine of not more than $10,000 and/or imprisonment of not less than 10 years
for an infected HCW's knowing treatment of a patient without disclosure).
31. 137 CONG. REc. E2377-78 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (reporting the Kimberly Bergalis
Patient & Health Providers Act of 1991).
32. See T.E. Margolis, Health Care Workers and AIDS: HIV Transmission In the Health
Care Environment, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 357, 368 n.81. (1992) (Helm's Amendment); id. at 374 n.
119 (Bergalis Act).
33. See 137 CONG. REC. H7404-05 (daily ed. Oct 3, 1991) (regarding 42 U.S.C. § 634).
Under the Act, the states were given one year to adopt guidelines comparable to those of the
CDC or forfeit their assistance under the Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. The
Senate version of the bill required states to adopt the exact CDC guidelines, but a House propo-
sal resulted in the modification of the law to allow states to adopt the equivalent of the CDC
guidelines. See 137 CONG. REc. S14346 & H7405 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1991). The measure, P.L.
102-141 was signed into law by President Bush on October 28, 1991.
1993]
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The CDC guidelines require adherence to universal precautions
and require infected HCWs to either disclose their infected status to
patients or to refrain from exposure prone invasive procedures. While
virtually all health experts endorse the universal precautions, the dis-
closure requirement is a significant source of controversy. Some con-
tend that infected HCWs have an ethical and legal duty to inform
patients before performing exposure-prone invasive procedures. 4
Opponents of disclosure contend that there is no valid reason to re-
quire such disclosure citing the low risk of transmission, 35 the possible
adverse effects on the health care system,36 and the infringement on
the privacy rights of the infected HCW.37
The boundaries of the "exposure-prone invasive procedure" con-
cept are ambiguous. In the beginning, the CDC solicited assistance
from leading medical organizations in developing a list of exposure-
prone procedures. 38 These organizations argued that there was no sci-
entific reason to preclude infected HCWs from performing any inva-
sive procedure and therefore refused to recommend any procedures
for the list.39 The CDC then shifted the responsibility for identifying
exposure-prone procedures to local public health panels on a case-by-
case basis.' This case-by-case approach frustrates the development of
a uniform definition. This approach will most likely produce a diver-
sity of definitions which, of course, will provide fertile grounds for
interjurisdictional legal problems.
Because the CDC guidelines are advisory and not compulsory,
medical facilities do not have to strictly enforce their provisions. The
guideline's lack of an enforcement mechanism lead some to question
their effectiveness in protecting patients from HIV transmission from
HCWs. To strengthen patient and HCW protection, Senators Ted
Kennedy (D-Mass) and Robert Dole (R-Kan) introduced a proposal
34. See, eg., Dorsett D. Smith, Physicians and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome,
264 JAMA 452 (1990); Barbara Gerbert et al., Physicians and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome: What Patients Think about Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Medical Practice, 262
JAMA 1969 (1989).
35. Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS. The "Right to Know" the
Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REv. 12,15 (1989); Daniels, supra note 17,
at 1368-69.
36. Eisenstat, supra note 18, at 316.
37. Larry Gostin, The HIV Infected Health Care Professionak Public Policy, Discrimina-
tion, and Patient Safety, ARcHrVEs OF ITEmRNAL MED. 663 (April 1991).
38. Medical Groups Oppose Plan to List Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 29 Gov'T
ErwPL RELi REP. (BNA) No. 1440, 1490 (1991).
39. Id.
40. Peggie Rayhawk, Health Care Workers with HIV: The Policy Confusion Continues, IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL AmDs REoRras 4 (Dec. 1991).
[Vol. 29:429
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requiring the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) to issue a set of compulsory guidelines. 4' Accordingly,
OSHA promulgated the Occupational Safety and Health Standards
which included a relevant section concerning occupational exposure
to HIV.42 The OSHA regulations require employers to develop writ-
ten infection control plans and to observe universal precautions. 43
They also provide enforcement provisions such as inspection and civil
penalties." The OSHA regulations met with little criticism because
they provided for no intrusive infection controls like testing or
disclosure.
Despite the CDC guidelines and the OSHA regulations, the pub-
lic harbors significant reservations about being unknowingly treated
by an infected HCW.45 Health care professionals see universal pre-
cautions and infection control as the best methods to prevent physi-
cian-to-patient transmission of HIV; however, the public has not been
easily convinced.' Public unrest has prompted some elected state of-
ficials to endorse strict testing and disclosure guidelines,47 and some
states are considering such strong measures.4" The Texas legislature
has actually enacted a law explicitly stating that the informed consent
doctrine applies in the context of HIV-infected health care workers.49
II. THE RIGHT TO INFORMED CONSENT
Though the debate continues in the medical community and
among state legislatures, the disclosure dilemma may find its ultimate
41. Pub. Law No. 102-170, 105 Stat. 1113-14 (1991).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1992).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. A Gallup Poll performed for NEWSWEEK indicated that 90 percent of the respondents
thought that iHV-infected HCWs should be required to disclose their conditions, and 65 percent
of respondents stated that they would discontinue treatment by an infected HCW. Kantrowitz et
al., supra note 8 at 51-52.
46. Id.
47. Larry Tye, Many States Tackling Issue of AIDS-Infected Health Care Workers, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 27, 1991, at 29.
48. AnDs Pouc" CENTER, THm GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, STATE BiLLs RE-
LATED TO HIV lNFECrED HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS--INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH POUcY
PROjECr (1992) (discussing Maryland S.B. 7 (1992), New Jersey A.B. 4918 (1991), New York
A.B. 4835 (1991), Delaware S.B. 275 (1992), Massachusetts H.B. 1303 (1992), Michigan H.B.
5291 (1992), Michigan S.B. 633 (1992), Missouri H.B. 1514 (1992), and New Hampshire S.B. 410
(1992)).
49. See TLx. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.201 (West 1992). The statute in ques-
tion reads: "A health care worker who performs an exposure prone procedure ... shall notify a
prospective patient of the health care worker's seropositive status and obtain the patient's con-
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solution in a court of law. It is likely that courts will require infected
HCWs to disclose their status to patients before performing exposure-
prone invasive procedures. Any HCW who performs an invasive
medical procedure without prior disclosure and the patient's informed
consent will likely do so at the risk of incurring liability."
A. Introduction to the Doctrine of Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent is well established in the field
of medical malpractice. It is based upon the principle that a physician
has a duty to adequately disclose to a patient the proposed diagnostic,
therapeutic, or surgical procedure to be undertaken, the material risks
involved with such treatment, and the alternatives available.,
Generally, consent given by a patient without full knowledge of
the risk involved is not informed consent and is therefore ineffective.
52
The doctrine is derived from at least two concepts. First, the doctrine
is premised upon the concept of individual autonomy.53 This concept
posits that the patient should decide what is in his or her best interest
and should make decisions based on his or her own personal judg-
ment.54 According to American jurisprudence, all competent adult
patients have a right to determine what is done to their bodies.
55
Hence, the doctrine of informed consent helps ensure that it is the
patient, not the physician, who ultimately decides the course taken
regarding matters of the patient's health.
Secondly, the doctrine recognizes that the average patient has lit-
tle or no understanding of the medical arts and usually looks to his or
her physician for the information needed to reach an intelligent deci-
sion. 6 Because of this relationship, the physician stands in a position
of trust and confidence with respect to the patient, creating a duty on
50. See Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991).
51. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972). There is a therapeutic
exception which allows the surgical procedure without consent when disclosure would be so
detrimental to the patient's well being that it would be unfeasible to adequately inform the
patient. Id. at 789. There is also an emergency exception which allows the surgical procedure
without consent where the patient is incapable of consenting and where imminent harm from the
failure to treat immediately outweighs any possible effect from the proposed treatment. Id. at
788-89.
52. Id. at 780.
53. Id. at 781.
54. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972).
55. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.12 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp.,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
56. Id. at 780.
[Vol. 29:429
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the part of the physician to exercise the utmost good faith.5 7 The fidu-
ciary nature of this relationship imposes duties of good faith and fair
dealing on the physician that exceed those duties existing in ordinary
arms' length transactions between two people. This duty requires
the physician to reveal to the patient that which is in the patient's best
interest to know,59 even if it is not in the best interest of the physician
to make such a disclosure.
The concepts of "patient autonomy" and "fiduciary relationship"
support the contention that patients have a right to know, and physi-
cians have a duty to disclose whether the patient is being exposed to
significant risk. The existing controversy is over exactly what a physi-
cian must disclose in order to fulfill his or her duty to a patient. The
application of the doctrine of informed consent to specific cases pro-
vides a more explicit idea of the scope of the physician's duty to the
patient.
B. Setting the Standard for the Doctrine of Informed Consent
In 1972 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals set the standard fol-
lowed by most jurisdictions for the doctrine of informed consent.
Canterbury v. Spence6° confronted the issue of whether a negligible
risk required disclosure in order for a patient's consent to be informed
and therefore effective. 61 Canterbury sustained personal injuries re-
sulting from an operation performed by Dr. Spence who performed a
laminectomy62 to correct a suspected ruptured disc. Dr. Spence told
Canterbury's mother that the operation was no more serious than any
other operation; however, the day after surgery Canterbury was para-
lyzed from the waist down and remained permanently disabled.63
Canterbury sued Dr. Spence alleging that Spence negligently failed to
disclose a risk of serious disablement inherent in the performed oper-
ationfr4 Dr. Spence argued that the risk was so slight that it did not
require disclosure and, furthermore, it would be bad medical practice
to disclose the minimal risk because disclosure might deter the patient
57. See Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1970).
58. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782.
59. See, eg., Phillips v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 416 N.E.2d 646, 648 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
60. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 777. A laminectomy is "the excision of the posterior arch of the vertebra." Id.
63. Id. at 777-78.
64. Id. at 778.
1993]
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from undergoing needed surgery or produce adverse psychological re-
actions which could affect the success of the operation.65 The court
held that a doctor must disclose all risks which a reasonable patient
would consider material in deciding whether to consent to the medical
treatment.
66
The Canterbury court ruled that where a plaintiff shows there was
a material risk associated with the treatment issued, which the physi-
cian failed to disclose, and which if disclosed would have caused a
reasonable patient in the plaintiff's position to forego the course of
treatment that injured the plaintiff, then the physician is liable for the
failure to disclose.67 This ruling provides a framework for deciding
whether the HIV-infected status of a physician is information which a
physician must disclose to be in accordance with the doctrine of in-
formed consent.
C. What Information Must a Physician Disclose in Order to Fulfill
His or Her Obligation to a Patient?
Since the doctrine of informed consent does not require that all
risks be disclosed to the patient, it is often unclear which risks require
disclosure. "Material" risks must be disclosed, yet materiality is a sub-
jective decision. Two primary standards have emerged regarding what
information must be provided in order for the physician to fulfill his
or her obligation to the patient. One standard relies on the learned
medical opinion of the reasonable physician while the other standard
focuses on what a reasonable patient would consider material.
Under the physician standard, a physician has a duty to disclose
those risks which a reasonable physician, under the same or similar
circumstances would disclose.6" Those jurisdictions that use this stan-
dard rationalize that the determination of what the patient needs to
know is essentially one of medical judgment requiring insight pro-
vided by the experience and expertise of those trained in such mat-
ters.6 9 The landmark case establishing the physician standard is
Natanson v. Kline. The Kline court said the determination of risks
65. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
66. Id. at 782, 786-87.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054-55 (Ariz. 1975); Stauffer v. Karabin,
492 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Green v. Hussey, 262 N.E.2d 156, 160 (Ill. App. Ct.
1970); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) clarified, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960);
Roberts v. Young, 119 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Mich. 1963); Marchlewicz v. Stanton, 213 N.W.2d 317,
320 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Bly v. Rhodes, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787 (Va. 1976).
69. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960) clarified, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960).
[Vol. 29:429
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that should be disclosed is a medical judgment and that so long as the
disclosure was sufficient to assure an informed consent, the physi-
cian's choice of plausible courses should not be called into question. 0
However, it must appear, all circumstances considered, that the physi-
cian was motivated only by the patients' best therapeutic interests and
that he or she proceeded as competent medical persons would have
done in a similar situation.71
While many states apply the physician standard to informed con-
sent cases, the situation involving an infected physician's failure to dis-
close his or her HIV positive status is one in which courts will find it
difficult to apply the physician standard. Courts using the physician
standard presuppose that the physician's decision whether or not to
disclose is motivated only by the patients' best therapeutic interests.
7 2
In most cases the disclosure revolves around risks that are inherent in
the medical procedure. The present situation is different because the
risks at issue are those that are created not from the procedure, but
from the physician. Where risks exist in a medical procedure, the pa-
tient has no alternative but to either forego the medical procedure or
subject himself to the risks. However, in the context of an HIV-in-
fected physician, the patient can alleviate the risk of infection without
foregoing the medical procedure by simply using the services of a dif-
ferent physician. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the decision about
disclosure is solely motivated by the patients' best therapeutic inter-
ests. The physician's decision may be motivated by personal interests
such as privacy, confidentiality, or the ability to continue in his or her
practice.73 This possibility is less likely in the typical informed consent
situation where the physician puts no personal interests at stake by
disclosing risks. The existence of the physician's self interest makes it
necessary to treat such situations differently from the typical informed
consent situations where the physicians' interests are more aligned
with the patients' interests. Because there are no assurances that
HIV-infected physicians are acting in their patient's best interest,
courts will find it difficult to justify handing the disclosure decision to
those physicians.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1106.
72. Id.
73. Larry Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Invasive Procedures,
19 HASTwnS CENmR REP. 32, 34 (JanJFeb. 1989).
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Allowing the physician to make such a decision is at odds with
the strongly held conception of the patient's right of self determina-
tion. In Canterbury, the court rejected the physician standard, reason-
ing that it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to
determine where his interests lie.74 The court viewed the physician
standard as being at odds with any strong conception of the patient's
right of self determination. In fact, the physician standard totally dis-
regards the patients' right to determine what risks they are willing to
expose themselves to. Since courts strongly favor the right of personal
autonomy, they are likely to rule that the physician standard is not
applicable in the context of an HI V-infected physician. More applica-
ble is the reasonable patient approach which gives the patient the ap-
propriate decision-making responsibility.75
In fact, many states, by action of courts and legislatures, have
abandoned the physician standard for the reasonable patient stan-
dard.76 The reasonable patient standard places a duty on the physi-
cian to disclose that which a reasonable patient would consider
material to his or her decision.77 The landmark informed consent de-
cision adopting the reasonable patient standard is Canterbury v.
Spence.78 The Canterbury court viewed the patient's right of self de-
termination as shaping the boundaries of the duty to disclose. The
court reasoned that the patient's right to self determination can only
be effectively exercised if the patient possesses enough information to
enable an intelligent decision.79 Thus, the court viewed the scope of
the physician's communication to the patient as being measured by
the patient's need, which is the need for information material to an
intelligent decision.80
Even under this rigorous patient standard, physicians are not ex-
pected to make full disclosure of every conceivable risk.81 It is unreal-
istic to expect physicians to discuss every risk surrounding a proposed
medical procedure no matter how small or how remote. For instance,
74. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
75. The reasonable patient approach has been adopted by many jurisdictions. See Lieber-
man & Derse, supra note 22, at 346 n.82. See also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Sard v.
Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972); Keogan v. Holy
Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975).
76. See ALLAN RosoFi, INFORMED CONSENT (1981).
77. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
78. Id. at 772.
79. Id. at 786-87.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 786.
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physicians are not obligated to disclose risks that are inherent in all
operations, such as the risk of infectionsYs2 The reasonable patient
approach requires physicians to disclose only those risks that an aver-
age, reasonable patient would consider material under the same or
similar circumstances.83
D. What Risks Are Material to the Reasonable Patient?
If courts are likely to require disclosure of risks that are material
to a reasonable patient, it must be determined what risks would be
material to a reasonable patient's decision. A risk is material if a rea-
sonable person in the patient's position would attach significance to
the risk;84 however, it is often hard to determine whether a reasonable
patient would find a certain risk significant. Determining the materi-
ality of a risk involves measuring the chance that the harm will occur
and the gravity of the harm should it occur.85 When the risk of harm
is improbable, the focus must be on its gravity. As the severity of a
potential harm becomes greater, the need to disclose an improbable
risk grows.86 Thus, the fact that a risk is remote will not always termi-
nate the duty to disclose under the doctrine of informed consent. For
example, In Hartke v. McKelway the plaintiff alleged that her physi-
cian's failure to disclose a .1 percent to .3 percent risk that a tubal
cauterization procedure might not succeed in preventing a future
pregnancy was a failure to obtain her informed consent.s7 The plain-
tiff wished to prevent future pregnancies because she had a history of
gynecological and pregnancy-related problems. The court concluded
that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would likely attach
significance to the risk!' Courts have been especially receptive to
claims where the gravity of the harm has been severe.8 9 In a situation
82. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
83. Id. at 786-87.
84. Id. (quoting Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. Rnv.
628, 639.40 (1970)).
85. Mary K. Logan, Informed Consent, 122 J. Am. DENTAL Ass'N 18, 19 (1991). See also
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517,523 (9th Cir. 1984); Adams v. Richland Clinic, Inc.,
681 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
86. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEE-rON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 171
(5th ed. 1984).
87. Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (viewing serious consequences of
pregnancy for patient, a jury could properly conclude that .1 percent to .3 percent chance of
undisclosed risk of subsequent pregnancy following sterilization procedure was material) cerL
denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
88. Id.
89. Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. App. 1974). Cases which have held that
failure to advise of a remote risk may be a basis for liability have done so on the basis of the
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involving minimal risk of a grave harm, a patient might be relieved by
the minimal risk of harm, but might reasonably find the risk signifi-
cant because the severity of the harm is considerable. Though it can-
not be said with certainty how any one situation will be resolved,
courts are likely to require disclosure of a risk when the possible harm
is extremely serious, even if the likelihood of that harm occurring is
minimal. 90
E. Is the Potential Exposure to AIDS from an Infected Physician a
Material Risk?
Opponents of mandatory disclosure contend that the risk of
HCW-to-patient transmission is not material because it is extremely
small.91 While small, the risk is not negligible due to the severity of
the potential harm. The risk to the patient is ultimately death. Courts
have specified that even a small chance of death may well be signifi-
cant.92 Thus, it would be reasonable for a patient to consider the
HIV-infected status of a physician material to a decision whether or
not to undergo invasive surgical procedure. Though a strong argu-
ment can be made that the risk of HIV infection is so small as to be
immaterial, the gravity of the risk renders it material and the risk
should be disclosed.
Moreover, knowledge of the risk provides the patient with an op-
portunity to avoid the risk of transmission entirely and still receive all
the therapeutic benefits of the procedure by simply choosing an
equally competent physician to perform the procedure. Furthermore,
public sentiment, as captured in opinion polls, leaves no doubt that
the vast majority of Americans believe such information is material93
and that HCWs should be required to tell patients if they are infected
devastating nature of that which was risked. Id. at 310. Examples of such risk are a complete or
partial paralysis, blindness, deafness or death. Id. See also, Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp.
989 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that a one percent to two percent risk of serious complications
should have been disclosed); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972) (stating that minimal disclo-
sure requires revelation that a given procedure inherently involves known risk of death or seri-
ous bodily harm).
90. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (specifying that a
"very small chance of death ... may well be significant" as well as "a potential disability which
dramatically outweighs the potential benefit of the therapy or the detriments of the existing
malady"); see also Lois M. Mousel, The Risk of Health Care Workers Transmitting AIDS to
Patients: Legal and Policy Implications; Is Disclosure the Answer?, 14 Ciair. Jusr. J. 81, 93-4 and
n.88 (1992).
91. Mark Barnes et al., The HIV-Infected Health Care Professionak Employment Policies
and Public Health, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 311, 327 n.56 (1990).
92. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787; Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (R.I. 1972).
93. See Kantrowitz et al., supra note 8, at 52.
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with the AIDS virus.94 Some argue that these public sentiments do
not reflect the expressions of reasonable patients. These people con-
tend that such sentiments are the product of a public hysteria over
AIDS that clouds rational judgment.95 If patients are acting on irra-
tional fears, the answer is to improve patient education and awareness
about HIV and AIDS not to abrogate the informed consent
procedure.
F. Causation
The informed consent analysis does not stop with the determina-
tion that a risk is material.96 The patient must prove not only that the
physician failed to disclose material information, but also that a rea-
sonable patient would not have consented to the treatment in ques-
tion had he or she been properly informed. 7 The Canterbury court
recognized that nonfulfillment of the physician's duty to disclose alone
did not establish liability to the patient.98 Any unrevealed risk that
should have been made known has to materialize, otherwise the omis-
sion is legally without consequence. 99 Furthermore there has to be a
causal connection between the physician's failure to adequately dis-
close and the damage to the patient."°° Courts have recognized that a
causal connection exists only when disclosure of significant risks inci-
dental to treatment would have resulted in a decision against the
treatment.10
94. ML; see also, Gerbert et al., supra note 34, at 1971; New AHA Guidelines Urge Univer-
sal AIDS Precautions, 16 MED. STAF NEWS 2 (Aug. 1987).
95. Gerbert et al., supra note 34, at 1971; Nancy Dickey, Physicians and Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome: A Reply to Patients, 262 JAMA 2002 (1989).
96. In a professional liability suit based on informed consent, the plaintiff must be able to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the physician had a duty to disclose certain
information, that the physician failed to disclose that information, that the patient would not
have consented to the treatment had full disclosure been made and that the patient suffered an
injury as a result of the physician's failure to adequately inform the patient. Logan, supra note
85, at 18.
97. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Various courts have re-
jected the reasonable patient standard, opting instead for a subjective causation test requiring
the patient to prove only that he or she would have refused the particular treatment had all
material risks been disclosed. Id. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979)
(holding that in a medical malpractice action a patient suing under the theory of informed con-
sent must allege and prove that if he had been informed of the risk, he would not have submitted
to the treatment).
98. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.; Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74,83-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) modified, 411 P.2d
45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106-07 (Kan. 1960) clarified, 354
P.2d 670 (1960); Hunter v. Burroughs, 96 S.E. 360, 369 (Va. 1918).
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The factual issue on causality calls for an objective rather than a
subjective determination." z The problem is that at the post injury
stage the patient knows the consequences of the medical procedure,
something he or she did not know at the time the decision was made
to proceed with the procedure. Any answer a plaintiff/patient gives
would probably, intentionally or unintentionally, be tinged by the fact
that the un-communicated hazard has in fact materialized.10 3 Because
of the credibility problem, the causality issue is better resolved on an
objective basis. The preferable approach is to decide the issue in
terms of what a reasonable person in the patient's position would have
decided if adequately informed of all material risks.'0 4 If adequate
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause a patient to decline
treatment because of the revelation of the kind of risk that resulted in
harm, causation is shown." 5
Reasonableness may be evidenced by the patient acting in a way
that most similarly situated people would act. Polls indicate that a
majority of people would refuse to undergo surgery or other invasive
procedures performed by an HIV infected physician. 106 Such polling
data is evidence that a reasonable patient would likely forego an inva-
sive procedure by an HIV-infected physician.
Furthermore, it is almost beyond argument that given an oppor-
tunity for the same medical benefit without the risk of death, however
small it might be, a reasonable patient would forego the risk. In other
types of informed consent cases, disregarding a particular treatment
because of inherent risks in the procedure is not without its own risks.
A patient must choose between the risks inherent in the procedure,
and the risks of foregoing the procedure. However, when the inherent
risk is infection by a HIV-positive physician, the risk dilemma can be
avoided. When informed about the physician's status, the patient may
choose an equally talented, uninfected physician to perform the pro-
cedure. This assumes another physician would be available to per-
form the procedure; however, in most circumstances, the assumption
102. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790.
103. Id. (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64
Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 647 (1970)).
104. Id. at 790; Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64
Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 648 (1970).
105. Id. at 790; Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74, 83-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) modified, 411
P.2d 45 (Ariz. 1966); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106-07 (Kan. 1960) clarified, 354 P.2d
670 (Kan. 1960); Hunter v. Burroughs, 96 S.E. 360, 369 (Va. 1918).
106. Of those surveyed, 65 percent would refuse to undergo surgery or other invasive proce-
dures performed by an HIV-infected HCW. Kantrowitz et al., supra note 8, at 52.
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is logical. Changing physicians is certainly reasonable since it allows
the patient to lose none of the medical benefits while eliminating any
risks associated with the infected physician. In fact, it is almost unrea-
sonable to choose to undergo invasive treatment by an HIV-infected
physician.
III. Is Ti= DocrRnE OF INFORMED CONSENT APPLICABLE TO
CASES INVOLVING HIV-INFECTED PHYSICIANS?
Despite what appears to be a compelling argument that physi-
cians must disclose their HIV-positive status or face liability based
upon the doctrine of informed consent, some contend that remote
risks associated with a physician are completely outside the doc-
trine." 7 It is argued that the doctrine was established so that patients
could render informed decisions concerning the risks and benefits of
surgical procedures and not as a means to protect themselves from
dangerous or incompetent physicians. 08 This argument is bolstered
by the fact that the doctrine does not require physicians to disclose
other personal conditions, such as alcoholism, which would expose
their patients to increased risks. Those that support this contention
ask if the doctrine should require physicians to reveal their HIV-posi-
tive status if the doctrine does not require an alcoholic physician to
reveal that status.
While the doctrine of informed consent might require disclosure
of a condition such as alcoholism, possible differences in the condi-
tions warrant different treatment. A physician suffering from chronic
alcoholism could increase the odds of exposure to an existing risk in-
herent in a particular procedure; however, the physician would not
actually increase the number of risks to which the patient is exposed.
In such a situation, the patient may be aware of all the existing risks
that are inherent in the particular surgical procedure. If so, requiring
disclosure about the physician's condition would not reveal any new
risks inherent in the medical procedure; rather, it would reveal infor-
mation concerning the physician's ability. Protecting patients from in-
competent or dangerous physicians is the sole responsibility of the
107. Chai R. Feldblum, A Response to Gostin, "The HIV-Infected Health Care Professionak
Public Policy, Discrimination, and Patient Safety," 19 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 134 (1991);
Logan, supra note 85, at 20.
108. Larry Gostin, The HIV-Infected Health Care ProfessionaL Public Policy, Discrimination,
and Patient Safety, 18 LAw MED. & HEAmTH CARE 303, 304 (1990).
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professional licensing authorities.10 9 But the licensing authority af-
fords no protection for patients from additional risks. Where a physi-
cian suffering from alcoholism increases the chance of harm from an
existing risk, an IfV-infected physician adds a new risk to the reposi-
tory of possible injuries the patient could sustain during surgery. Re-
quiring disclosure of a physician's HIV-positive status is not merely a
means of protecting a patient from a dangerous or incompetent physi-
cian; rather, it is a means of assuring that the patient is informed about
an additional material risk to which he or she will be subjected if the
procedure is performed by the infected physician. At least one
court supports the notion that the doctrine of informed consent re-
quires pre-surgery disclosure to patients of the infected status of an
HIV-positive physician. 1"0 A Superior Court in New Jersey recog-
nized that a physician has a duty to disclose to patients prior to per-
forming surgery, his HIV seropositive status, and to disclose the risk
of potential surgical accidents which could lead to exposure.' Dr.
William Behringer was a surgeon who had operating privileges at the
defendant medical center. Behringer was also admitted as a patient to
the medical center where he tested positive for HIV and was diag-
nosed with pneumocystic carinii pneumonia. These findings lead to
the determination that Behringer was suffering from AIDS. Attempt-
ing to resolve the dilemma surrounding infected surgeons, the hospi-
tal, at one point, required the use of a special "informed consent
form" to be presented to patients about to undergo surgery by HIV-
positive surgeons. As a result of the imposition of conditions on his
continued performance of surgical procedures at the medical center,
Behringer brought an action against the medical center seeking dam-
ages for violation of the New Jersey law against discrimination. On
the issue of informed consent, the court held that risk of surgical acci-
dent involving an AIDS-positive surgeon and implications thereof
would be a legitimate concern to a surgical patient, warranting disclo-
sure of the risk."' The court recognized the patient's right to personal
autonomy, reasoning that the ultimate arbiter of whether the patient
is to be treated invasively by an AIDS infected surgeon should be the
patient." 3 The court was persuaded that the risk involved would be
109. Id.
110. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991).
111. I.
112. Id. at 1280.
113. Id. at 1283.
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material to a reasonable patient." 4 Focusing on the gravity of the
harm, the court concluded that the ultimate risk to a patient from an
infected physician is so absolute and so devastating that it would be
untenable to argue against informed consent." 5
IV. LIKELY CONSEQUENCES IN COURT
The doctrine of informed consent imposes a duty on HIV-in-
fected HCWs to disclose their seropositive status to patients before
performing invasive procedures. The Behringer court held as such,
and has been cited with approval." 6 However, the controversy is not
settled. Often the harm that can arise from a risky endeavor is out-
weighed by the utility of that endeavor." 7 There are strong public
policy arguments to be made on behalf of the physician as well as on
behalf of the patient. Courts must still balance the competing interests
of the HCW and the patient. In balancing the competing interest
courts must determine whether the risk of physician-to-patient trans-
mission of AIDS and the magnitude of the harm if such risk is realized
is greater than the burden on the physician produced by disclosure." 8
The probability of actual exposure appears to be quite low,119 but the
consequences of the risk is death. Certainly disclosure will have a
devastating impact on the infected physician, both personally and pro-
fessionally. 120 Nevertheless, as evidenced by Behringer, courts are
114. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1280 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991).
115. l at 1283.
116. In Re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
117. Unreasonable risk is defined as risk that is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the
law regards as the utility of the act or manner in which it is done. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 291 (1965). Section 292 states that the social value advanced by the conduct, the extent
of the chance that such an interest will be advanced by the particular conduct, and the extent
that such interest can be adequately advanced by another less dangerous course of conduct are
factors weighed in determining the utility of an actors conduct. Id. § 292. Section 293 considers
four factors for determining the magnitude of the risk:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled;(b) the extent of the chance that the actors conduct will cause an invasion of any inter-
est of the other or of one of a class of which the other is a member,
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the interests imperiled;
(d) the number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk takes
effect in harm.
Id. § 293.
118. KEETON Er AT-, supra note 86, at 170-71.
119. The CDC places the risk of the virus being transmitted from an infected surgeon to a
patient between 1 in 42,000 and 1 in 417,000. 'lye, supra note 47.
120. Upon disclosing their HIV status, HCWs have had their ability to practice severely lim-
ited. Barnes et al., supra note 91, at 325 nn.7-14. They have lost most of their patients, have lost
hospital admitting privileges, and have experienced other forms of discrimination which make
the ability to practice almost impossible. Id.
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likely to find that the risk of HIV transmission is a material risk war-
ranting disclosure under the doctrine of informed consent.
V. CONCLUSION
Requiring disclosure of infected HCWs is controversial because it
has a devastating impact on the professional and social status of the
HCW, while the risk is seemingly small to the uninformed patient.
Those infected are deserving of compassion and should be protected
from unjust discrimination and unnecessary infringements on privacy.
However, the protection should not come at the expense of the un-
consenting patient who is unknowingly placed at risk by the failure to
disclose. Universal precautions and strict infection control are valua-
ble solutions to the prevention of transmission in the health care set-
ting, but the implementation of such solutions alone relegate patients
to passive roles in deciding what is in their best interest. Patients are
entitled to play an active role in deciding what risk to take, and physi-
cians have a duty to reveal information to the patient that is in the
patient's best interest to know. The guardian of the patient's right to
participate in such a decision is the doctrine of informed consent.
Even though the risk of HCW to patient transmission is arguably low,
the possible result is death. With so much at stake, the assessment of
the importance of the risk cannot be made by anyone but the patient
and the assessment cannot be made without disclosure. The Behringer
decision suggest that courts understand the significance of the risk and
will provide legal protection to those patients who are not informed
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